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I. INTRODUCTION
Employment discrimination is notoriously hard to prove.1 From
the scarcity of evidence2 to the skepticism of jurors,3 plaintiffs in
employment discrimination or employment retaliation cases face an
uphill battle to prove that a discharge or demotion was caused by
unlawful animus. Fortunately for Minnesota plaintiffs, however,
Minnesota courts have long employed a causation test that is more
plaintiff-friendly than the norm under many federal statutes. Under
the burden-shifting test established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 4 and adopted under many Minnesota workplace statutes,
plaintiffs can demonstrate causation simply by demonstrating that
unlawful animus was a “motivating factor” in an employment
decision.5 This standard is less stringent than the standard typically
employed under federal statutes such as the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), which requires plaintiffs to show that
unlawful animus was the “but-for” cause of an employment
decision.6
Nonetheless, Minnesota and federal cases have sometimes
blurred the line between Minnesota’s relaxed standard and the more
stringent but-for standard. Some Minnesota cases have applied a
functional “but-for” test by requiring plaintiffs to prove that an
employer had no motive besides unlawful animus. 7 The Eighth

1. Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to
Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 558 (2001).
2. Id. at 570.
3 . David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of
California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts
Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
511, 556 (2003).
4. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
5. McGrath v. TCF Bank Savs., 509 N.W.2d 365, 366 (1993).
6. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177–78 (2009).
7. See, e.g., Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., No. CX-01-1722, 2002 WL 655680,
at *3–4 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2002), aff’d on other grounds, 644 N.W.2d 801
(Minn. 2002) (reversing district court’s determination that employee could not
demonstrate retaliation because retaliatory animus was not the sole cause of
employee’s discharge), aff’d on other grounds, 644 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 2002).
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Circuit routinely applies a similar test to discrimination and
retaliation claims arising under Minnesota law.8
Clarity is needed from Minnesota’s courts or its legislature
regarding the applicable causation standard for discrimination and
retaliation claims under Minnesota law. The motivating-factor test
is preferable to the but-for test in view of the employee-protective
policies underlying Minnesota’s workplace discrimination and
retaliation statutes. A motivating-factor standard also better
accounts for the practical reality that employers often have multiple
reasons for making a single employment decision.9
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS TEST AND
CAUSATION STANDARDS UNDER FEDERAL LAW

Numerous federal workplace statutes prohibit employers from
discriminating against employees based on characteristics such as
age, pregnancy, race, and gender, and from retaliating against them
based on statutorily-protected conduct such as whistleblowing. The
best-known federal antidiscrimination statutes are Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 10 the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), 11 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA). 12 Others include the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(PDA), which amended Title VII to include pregnancy
discrimination as a type of sex discrimination; 13 the Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA),
which promotes reemployment of employees returning from active
military duty; 14 the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
(GINA), which prohibits employers from taking adverse action
8. See, e.g., Naguib v. Trimark Hotel Corp., 903 F.3d 806, 811–12 (8th Cir.
2018); Pedersen v. Bio-Medical Applications of Minn., 775 F.3d 1049, 1056 (8th
Cir. 2015).
9. See Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall, & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 626
(1988) (a but-for test permits employers who engage in unlawful discrimination
to escape liability by proving that “other legitimate reasons may coincidentally
exist that could have justified” the employer’s discriminatory action).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (1964).
11. Id. §§ 12101–12213 (1990).
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (1967).
13. Pub. L. No. 95–555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(k) (1976
& Supp. 1 1978)).
14. 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4335 (1994).

Spring 2019]

Zabinski

283

against employees because of genetic information; 15 and the
Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits disability-based discrimination
in federally-funded programs and institutions. 16 Other federal
statutes, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 17 and the
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA),18 forbid retaliation against
employees who engage in statutorily-protected conduct such as
participating in workplace investigations or taking medical leave.19
All of these workplace statutes protect employees’ civil rights
in the workplace. However, they are more complex than typical tort
claims20 because they involve not only an employer’s actions, but
also its motivations.21 An employment discrimination or retaliation
plaintiff must generally prove not only that his employer acted in a
certain way (for example, by discharging him), but that the
employer acted for the wrong reasons (discriminatory or retaliatory
animus). 22 This makes discrimination and retaliation claims
different from typical tort actions such as negligence, where a
plaintiff need only prove objective factors like causation and
damages. In a discrimination or retaliation case, a plaintiff must at
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff–2000ff-11 (2008).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–797 (1973).
17. Id. §§ 201–219 (1938).
18. Id. §§ 2601–2654 (1993).
19. See id. § 218c(a); see also id. §§ 2612(a), 2615(a).
20 . Scholars have questioned whether federal civil-rights laws should be
characterized as tort laws. See, e.g., Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes,
the Common Law, and Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2013); Martha
Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil Rights to Tort
Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115 (2007). Nonetheless, the United States
Supreme Court has characterized USERRA as a federal tort law, see Staub v.
Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2011), and drew heavily on tort-law concepts
of agency and causation to decide a question of vicarious liability under Title VII,
see generally Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). It characterized
Title VII’s retaliation provisions as tort claims. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v.
Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 346 (2013). State courts have routinely treated employment
retaliation as a tort. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Iowa, 913 N.W.2d 610, 618 (Iowa
2015) (citation omitted); Abraham v. Cty. of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 352
(Minn. 2002), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 639 N.W.2d 342
(Minn. 2002); Continental Coffee Products Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 453
(Tex. 1996); Chavez v. Manville Prods., 777 P.2d 371, 377 (N.M. 1989).
21 .
See Anastasia Niedrich, Removing Categorical Constraints on Equal
Employment Opportunities and Anti-Discrimination Protections, 18 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 25, 52 (2011) (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 52–54.
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least raise an inference about a subjective factor—an employer’s
motivation for treating the plaintiff in a certain way. 23
Recognizing the difficulty of directly proving an employer’s
subjective motivation, in McDonnell Douglas, the United States
Supreme Court established a burden-shifting test by which a
plaintiff may create an inference of subjective motivation.24 The test
has three stages. At the first stage, the plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case of discrimination or retaliation.25 For discrimination, the
prima facie case generally involves showing that the plaintiff had a
protected characteristic (such as age over forty or membership in a
racial minority), that she was qualified for or was satisfactorily
performing her job duties, and that she suffered an adverse
employment action (such as discharge or failure to hire). 26 For
retaliation, the prima facie case typically requires a plaintiff to show
statutorily-protected activity (such as whistleblowing or reporting
harassment), an adverse employment action (such as a discharge or
demotion), and a causal connection between the two.27 Second, the
employer may proffer a nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory
explanation for the adverse action. 28 Finally, the employee has a
chance to show that the employer’s proffered reason was pretext.29
While the McDonnell Douglas test originated under Title VII, the
test has been applied under several other federal workplace
antidiscrimination laws and antiretaliation laws.30
23. Id.; see also Phyllis Tropper Baumann et al., Substance in the Shadow of
Procedure: The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII
Cases, 33 B.C. L REV. 211, 229–30 (1992).
24. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
25. Id. at 802.
26. See, e.g., Bonilla-Ramirez v. MVM, Inc., 904 F.3d 88, 94 (1st Cir. 2018)
(citations omitted); Faulkner v. Douglas Cty., 906 F.3d 728, 732 (8th Cir. 2018)
(citing Pye v. Nu Aire, Inc., 641 F.3d 1011, 1019 (8th Cir. 2011)); RobersonKing v. Louisiana Workforce Comm’n, 904 F.3d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 2018)
(citations omitted).
27. See, e.g., Gillispie v. RegionalCare Hosp. Partners, 892 F.3d 585, 593 (3rd
Cir. 2018) (citing Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3rd Cir.
2015)); Rutledge v. SunTrust Bank, 262 F.Appx. 956, 969 (11th Cir. 2008)
(citations omitted).
28. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
29. Id. at 804.
30. See, e.g., Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1338, 1353 (2015)
(PDA); Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 51–52 (2003) (ADA); Batson
v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1328–29 (11th Cir. 2018) (retaliation under
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The first stage of the McDonnell Douglas test—the prima facie
stage—presents a relatively low hurdle for plaintiffs. Its key
elements are that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment
action and that “the most common explanations for an adverse
employment action, such as incompetence, are not applicable.”31 A
plaintiff will generally have firsthand knowledge if he has suffered
an adverse employment action, such as a demotion or a discharge.
Additionally, requirements at the prima facie stage are intended to
be de minimis, since the purpose of the prima facie stage is merely
to create a rebuttable presumption of discrimination or retaliation.32
The employer’s burden of production is even lighter. The employer
must merely articulate a nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory reason
for its actions and is not yet subject to any credibility analysis.33
Accordingly, the critical stage of the McDonnell Douglas test is the
third stage, commonly called the “pretext stage.”34 At this stage, the
credibility of the employer’s asserted reason is tested against the
strength of the presumption created by the plaintiff’s prima facie
case.35 The plaintiff can prevail “either directly by persuading the
court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence.”36
The recent trend under federal statutes has been to impose a butfor test at the pretext stage—that is, to require the plaintiff to show
that the adverse action would not have occurred but for the

the FMLA); Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 827 (5th Cir.
2015) (finding no error where a district court used McDonnell Douglas to analyze
a claim of retaliation under the GINA); Conner v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 121 F.3d
1390, 1394 (10th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted) (retaliation under the FLSA);
Burns v. City of Columbus, 91 F.3d 836, 843 (6th Cir. 1996) (Rehabilitation Act).
31. Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 1995)
(citing Krenik v. Cty. of Le Seuer, 47 F.3d 953, 958 (8th Cir. 1995)).
32. Development in the Law: Employment Discrimination, Shifting Burdens of
Proof in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1579, 1587
(1996).
33. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993); see also Shifting
Burdens, supra note 32, at 1587 (“[T]his second stage is little more than a
mechanical formality; a defendant, unless silent, will almost always prevail”
(citing Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510–11)).
34. Shifting Burdens, supra note 32, at 1581.
35. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
36. Id.
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employer’s discriminatory or retaliatory animus.37 Justifications for
the but-for test vary. For example, under the ADEA, the Supreme
Court has based its logic on the statutory text, holding that the
ADEA’s prohibition on discrimination “because of” age means that
discrimination must be a but-for cause of the employer’s actions.38
Federal appellate courts have applied the same analysis to the
ADA. 39 On the other hand, in deciding that Title VII retaliation
requires but-for causation, the Supreme Court looked to statutoryconstruction principles.40
Notably, the “but-for” standard does not apply to discrimination
claims under Title VII. 41 While the but-for standard originally
applied to all causes of action under Title VII,42 in 1991, Congress
enacted a more relaxed “motivating-factor” standard for claims of
discrimination under Title VII.43 The motivating-factor standard is
specific to Title VII and does not apply to other federal statutes.
Retaliation plaintiffs under Title VII must still meet the but-for
standard.44
One final note on federal statutes is needed to clarify the
difference between so-called “single-motive” and “mixed-motive”
cases. Federal case law has sometimes distinguished between
“mixed-motive” cases—where an employer had multiple reasons
for taking a particular action—and “single-motive” cases.45 While
37. See, e.g., Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 343 (2013)
(retaliation under Title VII); Batson v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1328–29
(11th Cir. 2018) (retaliation under the FMLA); Gentry v. E. W. Partners Club
Mgmt. Co., 816 F.3d 228, 235–36 (4th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted) (ADA);
Conner v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 121 F.3d 1390, 1394 (10th Cir. 1997) (retaliation
under the FLSA). Notably, the Seventh Circuit has interpreted Gross v. FBL Fin.
Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009), as mandating a default but-for causation for all
federal claims where the controlling statute does not incorporate explicit
motivating-factor language. Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d
957, 961–62 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 525–26
(7th Cir. 2009) (en banc)).
38. Gross, 557 U.S. at 176–78.
39. Gentry, 816 F.3d at 235–36; Serwatka, 591 F.3d at 961–62 (7th Cir. 2010).
40. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 354.
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); see also Nassar, 570 U.S. at 343.
42. See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 348 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, 258 (1989)).
43. Pub. L. 102–166, 105 Stat. 1075 (1991).
44. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 360.
45. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246–47.
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the applications of the McDonnell Douglas test in each situation are
beyond the scope of this article, the difference is irrelevant for
purposes of comparison with Minnesota law, because Minnesota
does not distinguish between mixed-motive and single-motive cases
when applying the McDonnell Douglas test.46
III. ADOPTION OF THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS TEST AND
DEVELOPMENT OF CAUSATION STANDARDS UNDER MINNESOTA LAW
Like federal law, Minnesota has enacted numerous statutory
schemes to combat workplace discrimination and retaliation. The
Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) 47 prohibits workplace
discrimination based on “race, color, creed, religion, national origin,
sex, marital status, status with regard to public assistance, familial
status, membership or activity in a local commission, disability,
sexual orientation, or age.”48 The MHRA also prohibits retaliation
against employees who engage in statutorily-protected conduct,
such as participating in a workplace investigation.49 The Minnesota
Workers’ Compensation Act (MWCA) 50 prohibits retaliation
against employees who seek workers’ compensation benefits,51 and
the Minnesota Whistleblower Act (MWA) prohibits retaliation
against employees who report their employers’ lawbreaking to
governmental or law enforcement officers.52
Minnesota has adopted the McDonnell Douglas test for cases
involving workplace discrimination or retaliation, including cases
arising under the MHRA, 53 the antiretaliation provisions of the
MWCA,54 and the MWA.55 Minnesota courts have noted that the
test translates easily to these state-law causes of action, since the
46. See Pinson v. Grazzoni Bros. & Co., No. A03-1567, 2004 WL 1254117, at
*7 (Minn. Ct. App. May 28, 2004) (citing Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall,
& Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 626–27 (Minn. 1988)).
47. MINN. STAT. §§ 363A.01–363A.44 (2018).
48. Id. § 363A.08, subdiv. 2.
49. Id. § 363A.15.
50. Id. §§ 176.001–176.862.
51. Id. § 176.82.
52. Id. § 181.932.
53. See Sigurdson v. Isanti Cty., 386 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. 1986).
54. Randall v. N. Milk Prods., Inc., 519 N.W.2d 456, 459 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994).
55. See McGrath v. TCF Bank Savs., 502 N.W.2d 801, 807 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993), aff’d, 509 N.W.2d 365 (Minn. 1993).
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state-law antidiscrimination and antiretaliation provisions resemble
the causes of action in Title VII, for which the McDonnell Douglas
test was created.56
However, unlike several of their federal counterparts,
Minnesota’s laws do not incorporate a but-for causation test at the
McDonnell Douglas pretext stage. 57 Instead, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs need only show that an
improper animus “more likely than not” motivated the adverse
employment action. 58 Motivating-factor causation requires the
plaintiff to show that discriminatory animus was a factor—but not
necessarily the only factor—in an employer’s action which is
challenged as discriminatory or retaliatory. 59 The court has twice
rejected the but-for test on public-policy grounds, first in Anderson
v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall, & Co.60 and later in McGrath v. TCF
Bank Savings, FSB.61
In Anderson, a discharged employee alleged that her discharge
was based on pregnancy, marital status, and sex discrimination in
violation of the MHRA.62 The plaintiff’s former employer claimed
that the discharge was performance-based. 63 The employer noted
serious performance issues in the plaintiff’s work history, including
misappropriation of the employer’s coupons to the plaintiff’s family
members and billing delays which exposed the employer to
liability. 64 The trial court found both parties credible. 65 The trial
court held the employer liable for discrimination under the MHRA,
despite its coexisting lawful motives for discharging the plaintiff.66
56. Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 398 (Minn. 1978) (stating that the MHRA
is “appears to be modeled after Title VII”); Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408
N.W.2d 569, 571–72 (Minn. 1978); McGrath, 502 N.W.2d at 807.
57. McGrath, 509 N.W.2d at 366.
58. Id.
59. See Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall, & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 626
(Minn. 1988).
60. Id. at 626.
61. 509 N.W.2d at 366.
62. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 620–21.
63. Id. at 622.
64. Id. at 621–22.
65. Id. at 622.
66. See Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall, & Co., Inc., 401 N.W.2d 75, 80
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987, rev’d, 417 N.W.2d 619 (Minn. 1988) (stating that the trial
court noted that “Anderson ‘clearly carried her ultimate burden for persuasion
and convinced the Court that, though defendant’s motives were mixed,
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The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed.67 First, the court noted
that Anderson involved a mixed-motive claim: the trial court had
credited both the employee’s testimony that her discharge was
discriminatory and the employer’s testimony that the discharge was
performance-based.68 Second, the court acknowledged that federal
courts at the time examined mixed-motive cases by utilizing a butfor causation standard. 69 Finally, the court held that an employer
should not be able to avoid liability for discrimination simply
because it had a coexisting lawful motive for an otherwise-improper
employment decision.70 A but-for test would “permit[] employers,
definitionally guilty of prohibited employment discrimination, to
avoid all liability for the discrimination provided they can prove that
other legitimate reasons may coincidentally exist that could have
justified the discharge.”71 The Minnesota Supreme Court held that
such an outcome would undermine the “broad remedial purposes”
of the MHRA. 72 Instead, it was sufficient for the plaintiff in
Anderson to show that discriminatory animus was a “causative
factor”—but not necessarily the only factor—in her employer’s
decision to discharge her.73
Five years later, in McGrath, a plaintiff brought a retaliatorydischarge claim under the MWA.74 The Minnesota Supreme Court
reiterated that an adverse action motivated by discriminatory or
retaliatory animus is not made lawful simply because the employer
had a coexisting lawful motive.75 The court noted that the court of
appeals had implied that an employer could survive the McDonnell
Douglas pretext stage in a mixed-motive case simply by
demonstrating a coexisting, nonretaliatory motive. 76 The court
reemphasized its holding in Anderson and rejected the notion that
[Anderson’s] pregnancy was a discernible, discriminatory, and causative factor
in defendant’s discharge of [her]’”).
67. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 630.
68. Id. at 623.
69. Id. at 625–27 (quoting Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1323–24 (8th Cir.
1985); Haskins v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 808 F.2d 1192, 1197–98 (6th Cir. 1987).
70. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 626.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 627.
74. McGrath v. TCF Bank Savs., 509 N.W.2d 365, 365 (Minn. 1993).
75. Id. at 366.
76. Id.
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“an employer could avoid liability [for a discriminatory discharge]
even if an illegitimate reason played a role in the discharge so long
as the other proffered reason was not pretextual.”77
Subsequent cases have applied Anderson and McGrath to
require that plaintiffs show improper animus as a “factor,” but not
as a sole motivation, at the pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas
test.78 Anderson and McGrath have never been overruled.
A. Application of a But-For Test at the McDonnell Douglas
Pretext Stage in Minnesota Cases
Despite Anderson and McGrath’s vigorous rejection of a butfor test at the pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis,
Minnesota courts have not always applied a true “motivatingfactor” test at the pretext stage. Several district courts have applied
a but-for test which has later been reversed on appeal.79 Moreover,
the Eighth Circuit applies a “determinative-factor” test to claims
arising under Minnesota law which functions as a but-for test.80

77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Carter v. Peace Officers Standards & Training Bd., 558 N.W.2d
267, 272 (Minn. 1997); Temple v. Metro. Council, No. A17-0410, 2017 WL
6272716, at *9 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2017); Pearson v. Rohn Indus., Inc., No.
A15-0477, 2015 WL 9264051, at *4–5 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2015); Ley v.
Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, No. C5-94-2126, 1995 WL 365472, at
*2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 1995).
79. See, e.g., Holtzman v. HealthPartners Servs., Inc., No. C7-02-375, 2002
WL 31012186, at *4–5 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2002); Schmidgall v. FilmTec
Corp., No. CX-01-1722, 2002 WL 655680, at *2–3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 23,
2002), aff’d on other grounds, 644 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 2002); Abraham v. Cty.
of Hennepin, No. C8-97-1907, 1998 WL 202771, at *3–4 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr.
23, 1998), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 639 N.W.2d 342
(Minn. 2002).
80. See Naguib v. Trimark Hotel Corp., 903 F.3d 806, 811 (8th Cir. 2018)
(citing Pedersen v. Bio-Med. Applications of Minn., 775 F.3d 1049, 1055 (8th
Cir. 2015)); Rothmeier v. Inv. Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1328 (8th Cir. 1996).
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1. “The” Reason Versus “a” Reason: District Courts
Applying a But-For Test
a. Holtzman v. HealthPartners Services, Inc.
Joyce Holtzman was a registered nurse who was terminated by
her employer, HealthPartners Services Inc., for failing to properly
implement a medication protocol.81 Holtzman was sixty-one years
old when she was terminated. 82 She brought a lawsuit for age
discrimination, alleging that she had informed HealthPartners about
problems with the protocol but had been ignored.83 Holtzman also
alleged that older employees at the HealthPartners clinic where she
worked were treated less favorably than—and often later replaced
by—younger employees.84
The Holtzman district court relied on the Supreme Court’s 1993
decision in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks.85 Hicks was a Title
VII case decided before Congress amended Title VII to incorporate
a motivating-factor test.86 Accordingly, Hicks had applied a but-for
test at the McDonnell Douglas pretext stage. 87 The Holtzman
district court cited the Hicks but-for test: “[An employer’s
proffered] reason cannot be ‘a pretext for discrimination’ unless it
is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was
the real reason.”88 The district court granted summary judgment for
HealthPartners.89
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed. 90 The court of
appeals noted that the district court’s test for pretext was “not the
precise standard to show pretext under Minnesota law.”91 Instead,
Holtzman needed to show only that discriminatory animus “more

81. See Holtzman, 2002 WL 31012186, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2002).
82. Id.
83. See id. at *1–2.
84. Id. at *2.
85. Id. at *4 (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993)).
86. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 505.
87. See id. at 515.
88 . See Holtzman, 2002 WL 31012186, at *5 (Halbrooks, J., dissenting)
(quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515 (emphasis in original)).
89. Id. at *1.
90. Id. at *4.
91. Id. at *4.
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likely than not” motivated her termination.92 The court of appeals
cited McGrath’s formulation of the motivating-factor test as the
correct test: “[E]ven if an employer has a legitimate reason for the
discharge, a plaintiff may nevertheless prevail if an illegitimate
reason ‘more likely than not’ motivated the discharge decision.”93
Holtzman’s case was remanded.94
b. Lundquist v. Rice Memorial Hospital
Rachael Lundquist was a registered nurse who was terminated
by her employer, Rice Memorial Hospital, for inability to perform
essential job duties. 95 Lundquist suffered a neck injury that
impaired her lifting abilities. 96 Lundquist filed a workers’
compensation claim but was denied coverage, placed on
unrequested medical leave, terminated, reinstated, and terminated
again. 97 The Hospital stated that both termination decisions were
based on Lundquist’s inability to perform lifting work. 98 However,
Lundquist claimed that she was terminated in retaliation for filing a
workers’ compensation claim. 99 Lundquist brought a claim for
retaliation under the MWCA.100
The district court characterized Lundquist’s burden at the
McDonnell Douglas pretext stage as follows: “[T]he burden then
shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that this proffered reason given
by [the] defendant was a pretext to cover up the real reason for her
termination—retaliation for her receipt of workers’ compensation

92. Id. at *5.
93. Holtzman, 2002 WL 31012186, at *5 (quoting McGrath v. TCF Bank Savs.,
509 N.W.2d 365, 366 (Minn. 1993)).
94. Holtzman, 2002 WL 31012186, at *4.
95. Lundquist v. Rice Mem’l Hosp., No. A07-0683, 2008 WL 467439, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2008).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Lundquist v. Rice Mem’l Hosp., No. 34-C5-00-299, 2007 WL 5688511,
Findings of Fact 16 at A-52, Findings of Fact 26 at A55 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 30,
2007).
99. See Lundquist, 2008 WL 467439, at *1.
100. Id. at *1–2.
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benefits.” 101 Following a bench trial, the district court granted
judgment for the Hospital.102
Lundquist appealed, arguing that the district court had applied
the wrong test for pretext. 103 The Minnesota Court of Appeals
agreed that a motivating-factor test would have been proper.104 The
court of appeals cited McGrath for the proposition that Lundquist
“[could] sustain her burden of proof by showing that ‘an illegitimate
reason “more likely than not” motivated the discharge decision.’”105
Ultimately, the court of appeals upheld the district court’s decision
because the district court’s factual findings demonstrated that
Lundquist could not have prevailed even under a motivating-factor
test.106 Nonetheless, the court of appeals did not adopt the district
court’s reasoning that Lundquist could have only shown pretext by
showing that discrimination was the single “real reason”—in other
words, the but-for cause—of her discharge.107
c. Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp. and Abraham v. County of
Hennepin
Wanda Schmidgall worked for FilmTec Corporation. 108 She
suffered three on-the-job injuries within a year.109 FilmTec had a
“same-shift reporting” policy which required employees to report
any on-the-job injury during the same shift in which it occurred.110
FilmTec terminated Schmidgall after she failed to comply with the
same-shift reporting policy for the third time.111 While it is unclear

101. Lundquist, 2007 WL 5688511, at Conclusions of Law 5 at A-50 (emphasis
added).
102. Id. at Order 1 at A-48.
103. See Lundquist, 2008 WL 467439, at *3.
104. See id.
105. Id. (citing McGrath v. TCF Bank Savs., 509 N.W.2d 365, 366 (Minn.
1993)).
106. Lundquist, 2008 WL 467439, at *3.
107. Id.
108. Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., No. CX-01-1722, 2002 WL 655680, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2002), aff’d on other grounds, 644 N.W.2d 801 (Minn.
2002).
109. Id.
110. See id.
111. Id.
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whether Schmidgall ever filed a workers’ compensation claim, she
brought a claim for retaliation under the MWCA.112
The trial court granted summary judgment for FilmTec.113 The
trial court found that because Schmidgall committed misconduct by
violating the same-shift reporting policy, Schmidgall could not
prevail at the McDonnell Douglas pretext stage.114
Schmidgall appealed, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals
reversed.115 First, the court of appeals examined the trial court’s test
for pretext.116 It noted that the trial court had apparently assumed
that Schmidgall was required to prove that retaliation was the sole
cause—that is, the but-for cause—of her discharge. 117 Because
misconduct was also a cause, the trial court had reasoned,
Schmidgall could not have prevailed. 118 The court of appeals
criticized the trial court’s reasoning as a “misunderstanding of the
final step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.” 119 The court of
appeals once again cited Anderson and McGrath’s motivatingfactor standard,120 noting that “[i]f Schmidgall can prove that it is
more likely than not that she was discharged” to obstruct her from
seeking workers’ compensation benefits or to retaliate against her
for seeking them, “she can prevail on her retaliatory-discharge claim
even if she was also discharged for violating the same-shift
reporting rule.”121
Schmidgall closely resembled the 1998 case of Abraham v.
County of Hennepin, in which a Minnesota trial court had found that
retaliation claims under the MWA and the MHRA could not
proceed because the plaintiffs were discharged by their employer,

112. See id. at *1–2.
113. Schmidgall, 2002 WL 655680, at *1.
114. See id. at *1–2.
115. Id. at *4.
116. Id. at *2–3.
117. Id.
118. Schmidgall, 2002 WL 655680, at *2–3.
119. Id. at *2.
120. Id. at *3 (citing Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d
619, 626–27 (Minn. 1988); McGrath v. TCF Bank Savs., 509 N.W.2d 365, 366
(Minn. 1993)).
121. Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
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Hennepin County, for employment misconduct. 122 The trial court
did not expressly apply a McDonnell Douglas analysis.123 However,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, noting that a McDonnell
Douglas analysis was warranted and that the plaintiffs were not
required to prove that retaliatory animus was the sole cause—that
is, the but-for cause—of their terminations.124 The court of appeals
noted that “[i]f retaliation motivated the county, [the plaintiffs] may
prevail even though the county also had a legitimate reason for the
discharges.”125
The trial courts in Holtzman, Lundquist, and Schmidgall all
purported to apply a McDonnell Douglas analysis to claims of
employment discrimination and employment retaliation arising
under Minnesota state law. Similarly, Abraham appeared to make a
decision within the McDonnell Douglas framework, even though it
did not expressly apply a McDonnell Douglas analysis. However,
each trial court required the plaintiff to meet a higher burden of
proof than the burden actually set by Minnesota law. Of these cases,
the most alarming is probably Lundquist, which misstated
Minnesota’s test for the McDonnell Douglas pretext stage a full
fifteen years after McGrath was decided.
Fortunately, in each case the court of appeals recognized the
trial court’s error and reversed when necessary. None of the cases
resulted in a published decision, and none of the cases resulted in
review from the Minnesota Supreme Court regarding the court of
appeals’ application of McDonnell Douglas.126
d. A Possible Explanation: The Language of McDonnell Douglas
Notably, the trial courts in Holtzman, Lundquist, Schmidgall,
and Abraham shared a common lexicon. Each court implied that the
122. See Abraham v. Cty. of Hennepin, No. C8-97-1907, 1998 WL 202771,
*1–4 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1998), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other
grounds, 639 N.W.2d 342 (Minn. 2002).
123. See Abraham, 1998 WL 202771, at *4.
124. Id.
125. Id. at *4 (citing McGrath, 509 N.W.2d at 366 (quoting Anderson, 417
N.W.2d at 627)) (emphasis added).
126. Abraham and Schmidgall were both reviewed by the Minnesota Supreme
Court, but neither appeal involved the application of the McDonnell Douglas test.
See generally Abraham v. Cty. of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342 (Minn. 2002);
Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., 644 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 2002).
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plaintiff needed to prove that his or her employer had a single
motive—discriminatory or retaliatory animus—for the plaintiff’s
termination. In Holtzman, the plaintiff had to prove that
“discrimination was the real reason [for the discharge].” 127
Similarly, in Lundquist, the plaintiff had to prove that the
defendant’s proffered reason was “a pretext to cover up the real
reason for her termination.” 128 In Schmidgall and Abraham, the
plaintiffs had to prove that their terminations were solely motivated
by animus, independent of their misconduct.129 This type of singlemotive test is functionally a but-for test. It presumes that
discriminatory or retaliatory animus do not make an employer’s
action illegal unless the animus is outcome-determinative.
Several other Minnesota cases employ the same lexicon even
while applying the proper motivating-factor test. Fletcher v. St. Paul
Pioneer Press, a leading case on retaliation under the MHRA,
characterizes the plaintiff’s burden at the McDonnell Douglas
pretext stage as “show[ing] that the proffered reasons were not the
true reason for the [adverse employment] action.” 130 This
formulation implies that an employer has only one motivation for
its actions. Other courts have suggested that plaintiffs must “refute”
the employer’s proffered reason rather than providing evidence of
coexisting motives, 131 demonstrate pretext in addition to
demonstrating that improper motives were a causative factor in the
adverse employment decision,132 or show that animus motivated an
employer “rather than” a lawful reason.133 All of these formulations
127 .
Holtzman v. HealthPartners Servs., Inc., No. C7-02-375, 2002 WL
31012186, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2002) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr.
v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993)) (emphasis added).
128. Lundquist v. Rice Mem’l Hosp., No. 34-C5-00-299, 2007 WL 5688511,
Findings of Fact 5 at A-50 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 30, 2007) (emphasis added).
129. Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., No. CX-01-1722, 2002 WL 655680, at *2
(Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2002), aff’d on other grounds, 644 N.W.2d 801 (Minn.
2002); Abraham v. Cty. of Hennepin, No. C8-97-1907, 1998 WL 202771, at *3–
4 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1998), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds,
639 N.W.2d 342 (Minn. 2002).
130. 589 N.W.2d 96, 102 (Minn. 1999) (emphasis added).
131. VanGinsven v. City of Canby, No. C9-00-969, 2000 WL 1778310, at *2–
3 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2000) (internal quotations omitted).
132. See Carter v. Peace Officers Standards & Training Bd., 558 N.W.2d 267,
272 (Minn. 1997).
133. See Pinson v. Grazzoni Bros. & Co., No. A03-1567, 2004 WL 1254117,
at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. May 28, 2004).
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suggest that the plaintiff’s burden is greater than merely
demonstrating that discriminatory or retaliatory animus was a
motivating factor in an employment decision. They resemble
language from federal case law requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate
that an employer’s “proffered legitimate reasons were not what
actually motivated its conduct.”134 In other words, they require a
plaintiff to prove that retaliatory or discriminatory animus was the
sole and but-for cause of an employer’s action.
This language is understandable to a certain degree because it is
the language of McDonnell Douglas itself. McDonnell Douglas
characterized the pretext stage as allowing plaintiffs to unmask an
employer’s “coverup” of its illegitimate motive. 135 McDonnell
Douglas implied that an employer’s actions can be explained by a
single determinative motive. 136 Accordingly, Minnesota courts
looking to McDonnell Douglas itself will find language that tends
to suggest a but-for test. However, Anderson and McGrath have
modified the plaintiff’s burden at the McDonnell Douglas pretext
stage in ways that McDonnell Douglas itself does not describe.
Thus, in most cases, terminology that implies that an employer has
a single, outcome-determinative motivation for a given employment
decision overstates the plaintiff’s burden at the pretext stage.
2. Application of a But-For Test at the Eighth Circuit
While the Minnesota Court of Appeals has reversed districtcourt cases that applied an incorrect test at the McDonnell Douglas
pretext stage, it cannot reverse federal cases. Unfortunately, a recent
federal case applying the McDonnell Douglas test to claims arising
under Minnesota law has applied a functional but-for test rather than
the motivating-factor test that Minnesota law provides.137

134. See Batson v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1331 (11th Cir. 2018)
(quoting Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997)).
135. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 793, 805 (1973) (“[O]n the
retrial respondent must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by
competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in
fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision”).
136. Id.
137. See Naguib v. Trimark Hotel Corp., 903 F.3d 806, 811–12 (8th Cir. 2018).
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a. Requiring Plaintiffs to Disprove an Employer ’ s Proffered
Reason
In a recent case involving retaliation claims under the MHRA,
the Eighth Circuit has described the plaintiff’s burden at the
McDonnell Douglas pretext stage as both discrediting the
employer’s asserted reason and creating a reasonable inference that
retaliatory animus was “the real reason” for the adverse
employment action.138 The Eighth Circuit’s test produced different
results than the plaintiff would likely have obtained in state court.
In Naguib v. Trimark Hotel Corp., Isis Naguib alleged that she was
terminated from employment as a housekeeping manager at
Millennium Hotel in retaliation for actions such as providing
deposition testimony that might have been detrimental to
Millennium in past litigation.139 However, Millennium stated that
Naguib was terminated for requiring employees to under-report
their overtime hours.140 The Eighth Circuit held that Naguib could
not prevail at the McDonnell Douglas pretext stage because she
“ha[d] not discredited Millennium’s version of events.”141 In other
words, because Naguib failed to prove that Millennium’s proffered
reason was false (and thus that unlawful animus was the only reason
for her discharge), Naguib was unable to survive the McDonnell
Douglas pretext stage.142
Naguib resembles the Minnesota trial courts’ decisions in
Schmidgall and Abraham. In each of those cases, the trial court
required the plaintiff to show that an employer’s proffered reason
for discharging him or her—employment misconduct—was
untrue.143 Like the Eighth Circuit, the Schmidgall and Abraham trial
courts effectively required plaintiffs to show that unlawful animus

138. Naguib, 903 F.3d at 811 (citing Pedersen v. Bio-Med. Applications of
Minn., 775 F.3d 1049, 1055 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015)).
139. Naguib, 903 F.3d at 809–10.
140. Id. at 811.
141. Id. at 812.
142. See id.
143. Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., No. CX-01-1722, 2002 WL 655680, at *2
(Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2002), aff’d on other grounds, 644 N.W.2d 801 (Minn.
2002); Abraham v. Cty. of Hennepin, No. C8-97-1907, 1998 WL 202771, at *3–
4 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1998), aff’d in part and rev’d on other grounds, 639
N.W.2d 342 (Minn. 2002).
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was the sole cause of their terminations. 144 However, Schmidgall
and Abraham were reversed on appeal.145 In each case, the court of
appeals reiterated that the plaintiff could prevail at the McDonnell
Douglas pretext stage if the plaintiff had been discharged for an
unlawful reason, even if the employer also had a legitimate reason
for the discharge. 146 In state court, Naguib might well have
prevailed at the pretext stage because she would been required only
to demonstrate that retaliatory animus was a motivating factor in her
termination.
b. Expressly rejecting the motivating-factor
“determinative-factor” causation

test

through

The Eighth Circuit has also described the plaintiff’s burden at
the McDonnell Douglas pretext stage as discrediting the employer's
proffered reason and creating a reasonable inference that unlawful
animus was a “determinative factor” in the employer’s adverse
decision.147 Determinative-factor causation implies a different test
than motivating-factor causation. In a recent case involving Title
VII retaliation, the Eighth Circuit used the term “determinative
factor” as a proxy for the but-for causation test required for Title
VII retaliation claims. 148 It expressly contrasted this term with
motivating-factor causation. 149 The Eighth Circuit has applied
determinative-factor causation to discrimination and retaliation
claims under the MHRA.150
The Eighth Circuit’s divergence from Minnesota’s motivatingfactor standard is problematic because Minnesota district courts
occasionally cite to Eighth Circuit cases in articulating the proper
144. Id.
145. Schmidgall, 2002 WL 655680, at *4; Abraham, 1998 WL 202771, at *5.
146. Schmidgall, 2002 WL 655680, at *3; Abraham, 1998 WL 202771, at *4.
147. See, e.g., Rothmeier v. Inv. Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1328 (8th Cir.
1996).
148. Carrington v. City of Des Moines, 481 F.3d 1046, 1053 (8th Cir. 2007)
(“At summary judgment, [the plaintiff] must show a ‘genuine issue of material
fact’ that the City's stated reason for the discharge is pretextual and that retaliation
was a determinative—not merely a motivating—factor. The record does not
support such an inference, and this court declines to adopt [the plaintiff’s]
weakened standard”).
149. Id.
150. Macias Soto v. Cork-Mark Int’l, Inc., 521 F.3d 837, 841 (8th Cir. 2008)
(retaliation); Cronquist v. City of Minneapolis, 237 F.3d 920, 926 (8th Cir. 2001)
(retaliation); Rothmeier, 85 F.3d at 1336–37 (age discrimination).
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test for the McDonnell Douglas pretext stage. While it does not
appear that any state courts have actually applied a but-for standard
or have purported to apply determinative-factor causation, there is
a risk that Minnesota courts may assume the standards are
interchangeable and may subject plaintiffs’ claims to the very
standards rejected in Anderson and McGrath.
IV. WHAT TEST SHOULD MINNESOTA APPLY?
Minnesota courts—and federal courts applying Minnesota
law—have not always faithfully applied the McDonnell Douglas
test as directed in Anderson and McGrath. As a result, there is a
need for clarity about what test should be applied to claims arising
under state law, regardless of which court applies the test. This
clarification could come from Minnesota appellate courts reiterating
the need to differentiate between state and federal standards at the
McDonnell Douglas pretext stage. However, it could also involve
legislative action specifying the appropriate causation standard, as
Congress did when it amended Title VII to create a motivatingfactor standard for discrimination claims.151
Notably, there are compelling reasons to adopt a but-for test for
state-law causes of action whose federal counterparts are analyzed
under a but-for standard. However, in light of the broad employeeprotective purposes of state laws such as the MHRA, the better
public policy is to retain the motivating-factor standard.
A. Reasons to Adopt a But-For Test
To simplify the confusion caused by federal cases construing
Minnesota law, Minnesota could directly adopt a but-for causation
test at the state level. In fact, Minnesota routinely looks to parallel
Title VII law in interpreting the MHRA.152 The statutes have similar
language and a similar purpose,153 and applying a uniform causation
standard for federal and state-law causes of action would promote a
151. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013).
152 .
See, e.g., Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 399–400 (Minn. 1978)
(adopting the McDonnell Douglas analysis for disparate treatment claims); Bhd.
of Ry. and S.S. Clerks v. State, 229 N.W.2d 3, 9–11 (Minn. 1975) (longstanding
discriminatory employment systems are not “grandfathered in” under the
MHRA).
153. Hubbard v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 441 (Minn. 1983).
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clearer understanding among employers and employees about the
scope and boundaries of employee civil rights. Notably, the MHRA
and the MWA prohibit discrimination and retaliation “because of”
an employee’s protected traits or “because” an employee engaged
in statutorily-protected conduct. 154 A but-for test would be
consistent with other cases holding that the word “because” implies
a but-for causation standard.155
Adopting the federal standard at the state level would alleviate
a second concern: the existence of dual causation standards for
state-law claims depending on whether the claims are heard in state
or federal court. Plaintiffs frequently claim that an employment
action violated both state and federal antidiscrimination laws. 156
Additionally, a lawsuit involving state-law discrimination or
retaliation claims may end up in federal court because it implicates
other federal statutes such as ERISA.157 As Naguib demonstrates,
plaintiffs in federal court may have to prove but-for causation at the
McDonnell Douglas pretext stage even if they would only need to
prove motivating-factor causation in state court.158 Adopting a butfor standard at the state level would eliminate the disparity between
Minnesota’s application of a motivating-factor test to state-law
claims and federal courts’ applications of a but-for test to the same
claims.
Finally, adopting a uniform standard would minimize the
likelihood of juror confusion at trial. Employment discrimination
and retaliation questions present complex factual issues. 159 The
154. See MINN. STAT. §§ 363A.08, subdiv. 2, and 181.932, subdiv. 1 (2018).
155. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009); Gentry
v. E.W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co., 816 F.3d 228, 235–36 (4th Cir. 2016).
156. See, e.g., Pedersen v. Bio-Med. Applications of Minn., 775 F.3d 1049,
1051 (8th Cir. 2015) (retaliation under Title VII and the MWA); Torgerson v.
City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1035 (8th Cir. 2011) (race discrimination under
Title VII and the MHRA); Hervey v. Cty. of Koochiching, 527 F.3d 711, 715 (8th
Cir. 2008) (sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and the MHRA);
Heimbach v. Reidman Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1175 (8th Cir. 2001)
(disability discrimination under the ADA and the MHRA); Wilking v. Cty. of
Ramsey, 153 F.3d 869, 872 (8th Cir. 1998) (disability discrimination under the
ADA and the MHRA); Rothmeier v. Inv. Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1331 (8th
Cir. 1996) (age discrimination under the ADEA and the MHRA).
157. See Naguib v. Trimark Hotel Corp., 903 F.3d 806, 812 (8th Cir. 2018).
158. See id. at 811 (citing Pedersen, 775 F.3d at 1055).
159. See Sigurdson v. Isanti Cty., 386 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. 1986). Indeed,
the factual complexity of employment-discrimination cases was one reason the
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United States Supreme Court has noted that workplacediscrimination claims are especially complex for juries. 160 That
complexity is heightened when jurors must decide claims under
competing theories of liability. 161 Adopting a single standard for
analyzing claims at the pretext stage would prevent issue confusion
and the need for complex, multi-part jury instructions.
B. Problems with Adopting a But-For Test
Despite the appeal of uniformity, adopting a but-for test under
Minnesota’s antidiscrimination and antiretaliation laws poses
problems. First of all, adopting a but-for test would not guarantee
uniformity with federal law. Some federal statutes—notably the
ADA and the discrimination provisions of Title VII—do not apply
a but-for causation test.162 Accordingly, the benefits of adopting a
uniform standard for the McDonnell Douglas pretext stage would
not affect litigation involving state-law causes of action and parallel
provisions of the ADA or Title VII’s discrimination section. This
lessened impact is significant because complaints of disability
discrimination and race discrimination—both of which would be
covered by the ADA and/or Title VII’s discrimination provisions—
are among the most common MHRA complaints raised in
Minnesota.163
Minnesota Supreme Court required district courts to make explicit findings at
each stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. See id. at 721–22.
160. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S.Ct. 2434, 2451 (2013) (“Courts and
commentators alike have opined on the need for reasonably clear jury instructions
in employment discrimination cases. And the danger of juror confusion is
particularly high where the jury is faced with instructions on alternative theories
of liability under which different parties bear the burden of proof”).
161. Id.
162. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). The Supreme Court has not reached the issue
of the ADA’s causation standard, although federal Circuits have concluded that
but-for causation applies. See Gentry v. E. W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co, 816 F.3d
228, 235–36 (4th Cir. 2016); Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d
957, 961–62 (7th Cir. 2010).
163 . MDHR Enforcement Case Summaries: MDHR Cases with Probable
Cause Determinations, 2011-2015, MINN. DEP’T OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 7 (Feb.
2016),
https://mn.gov/mdhr/assets/Case_Summaries_Report_tcm1061229708.pdf [https://perma.cc/5B5A-Y794]. Notably, this report focused on
complaints filed with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights (MDHR), the
state agency responsible for enforcing the MHRA, and not on private litigation.
However, the high number of complaints filed for race and disability
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Second, adopting a but-for test would reduce the scope of
Minnesota employees’ civil rights. But-for causation implies
different substantive rights than motivating-factor causation. Butfor causation means that civil rights functionally protect employees
only when an employer’s discriminatory or retaliatory animus is
outcome-determinative. Under cases like Naguib, a discrimination
or retaliation plaintiff may lose even a meritorious case because her
employer had a coexisting lawful motive. 164 Motivating-factor
causation, on the other hand, means that civil rights are violated
when unlawful animus plays a role in an employer’s decision, even
if the role is not outcome-determinative. Motivating-factor
causation implies a broader scope of employee rights: the right
against inclusion of unlawful considerations in an employer’s
decision making, even if the employer could justify its decision on
separate grounds.
This broad scope of civil rights—freedom from unlawful
considerations—better promotes the purpose of Minnesota’s
antidiscrimination and antiretaliation laws. The stated public policy
of the MHRA, for example, is “to secure for persons in this
state . . . freedom from discrimination” in areas of activity including
employment. 165 The MHRA creates a statutory civil right to the
“opportunity to obtain employment . . . without such discrimination
as is prohibited by this chapter.” 166 The legislature’s broad
language—“freedom
from
discrimination”
and
“without . . . discrimination”—implies that discriminatory decision
making is intolerable even if a discriminatory decision could be
justified on other grounds. “Freedom from discrimination” means
freedom from discriminatory processes, not just discriminatory
outcomes.
Finally, motivating-factor causation better accounts for the
practical reality that employers often have multiple motives for a
single decision. It is not difficult for employers to articulate a
discrimination can provide a rough proxy to estimate the proportion of race- and
disability-related complaints likely to be litigated. Moreover, the next-mostcommon claims field with the MDHR are claims of gender or sex discrimination
and age discrimination, which could also be covered by Title VII’s discrimination
provisions.
164. See Naguib v. Trimark Hotel Corp., 903 F.3d 806, 812 (8th Cir. 2018).
165. MINN. STAT. § 363A.02, subdiv. 1 (2018).
166. Id. at subdiv. 2.
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nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory reason for an employment
action. 167 Many can suggest several. 168 McGrath and Anderson
emphasized that the purpose of the motivating-factor standard was
to prevent employers who were “definitionally guilty of prohibited
employment discrimination” or retaliation from escaping liability
by proving that “other legitimate reasons may coincidentally exist
that could have justified” the employer’s discriminatory or
retaliatory action. 169 The motivating-factor standard accounts for
this practical reality by clarifying that a plaintiff’s claim can prevail
even if the employer had a coexisting lawful motive for its
actions.170
V. CONCLUSION
Minnesota has long utilized a plaintiff-friendly “motivatingfactor” standard at the pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas test.
This standard allows plaintiffs to prevail on employment
discrimination or retaliation claims where an employer’s
discriminatory or retaliatory animus was a factor in the employer’s
action, rather than the but-for cause of an employer’s action.
However, some Minnesota courts have eroded the motivating-factor
test by applying a functional but-for test or characterizing the test in
language that suggests a but-for test. Federal courts deciding
discrimination and retaliation claims arising under Minnesota law
have applied a but-for test rather than the proper motivating-factor
test.
Minnesota courts should reiterate that the motivating-factor
standard is the appropriate test for causation at the McDonnell
Douglas pretext stage without reference to but-for causation
principles. The Minnesota legislature would do well to consider
adding express statutory language to the MHRA, the MWCA, and
the MWA directing courts to consider plaintiff’s claims under a
motivating-factor standard. The motivating-factor standard better
167. See Shifting Burdens, supra note 32, at 1587.
168. See, e.g., Temple v. Metro. Council, 2017 WL 6272716, at *4 (Minn. Ct.
App. Dec. 11, 2017) (employee was told he was discharged for (1) failing to
properly perform duties; (2) secretly recording conversations; (3)
insubordination; (4) failure to provide required notifications; and (5) falsification
of records).
169. Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall, & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Minn.
1988); see also McGrath, 509 N.W.2d 365, 366 (Minn. 1993).
170. See id.
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accounts for the practical reality that employers often have multiple
reasons for a single employment decision and better safeguards the
employee-protective policies underlying Minnesota’s workplace
discrimination and retaliation statutes.

